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Abstract 
 
The past decades have witnessed falling wage shares and a polarization of personal income 
distribution. Average wages and average labour compensation have not kept up with 
productivity growth. Functional income distribution has shifted at the expense of labour. In 
many countries personal income distribution has also become more unequal. By many 
measures income inequality is worse than at any time in the 20
th
 century. At the same time 
economic growth processes have become imbalanced. Financial crises have become more 
frequent; household debts have risen sharply; international imbalances have increased, with 
some countries relying excessively on export growth. This paper argues that the polarization 
of income distribution and the decline in the wage share play an important role in the 
generation of imbalanced and unequal growth, and that a pro-labour wage policy will form an 
important part of a policy package that generates a stable growth regime. A wage-led growth 
strategy is thus advocated. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The past decades have witnessed falling wage shares and a polarization of personal income 
distribution. Average wages and average labour compensation have not kept up with 
productivity growth. Functional income distribution has shifted at the expense of labour. In 
many countries personal income distribution has also become more unequal. By many 
measures income inequality is worse than at any time in the 20th century. At the same time 
economic growth processes have become imbalanced. Financial crises have become more 
frequent; household debts have risen sharply; international imbalances have increased, with 
some countries relying excessively on export growth. This paper argues that the polarization 
of income distribution and the decline in the wage share play an important role in the 
generation of imbalanced and unequal growth, and that a pro-labour wage policy will form 
an important part of a policy package that generates a stable growth regime. A wage-led 
growth strategy is thus advocated. 
 
The advocacy of a wage-led growth strategy has a long history. It has been articulated in 
reformist visions within the labour movement and was discussed under the heading of 
‘underconsumption’ in 19th century economics. The theory got a boost from the theories of 
effective demand developed by Keynes and Kalecki. The modern theoretical debates on 
wage-led demand based on seminal papers by Rowthorn (1981), Dutt (1984) and Bhaduri 
and Marglin (1990). The policy-oriented concept of a wage-led growth strategy was 
prominently used by UNCTAD (2010). 
 
Section 2 of this paper will provide a policy-oriented framework for the analysis of the 
interaction between distribution and growth. We will distinguish between distributional 
policies and economic regimes. Pro-labour policies aim at increasing wages, whereas pro-
capital distributional policies aim at suppressing wage growth and increasing profit margins. 
The macroeconomic regime of a country is determined by the structural features of its 
economy, such as its openness to international trade, its financial system and the 
characteristics of its welfare state. We will distinguish between wage-led and profit-led 
economic regimes, or more precisely between wage-led and profit-led demand and supply 
regimes. In a wage-led regime an increase in the wage share has positive effects that mean 
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higher economic activity (in the short run) and faster accumulation of capital (in the long 
run), both through demand-side effects, or faster productivity growth on the supply side. By 
contrast, a profit-led economic regime would occur whenever a decrease in the share of 
wages or an increase in the profit margins of firms generate positive effects on the 
economy.  
 
Section 3 investigates the causes of changes in income distribution, in particular the long-
run reduction in the share of wages. Section 4 provides more details as to why an economy 
would exhibit a wage-led economic regime, looking both at supply-side effects,  that is the 
relationship between the share of wages and labour productivity growth, and at demand-
side effects. This section also has a summary of some recent empirical research, providing 
the approximate size of some key effects on the demand side. Section 5 will classify the 
actual experience of key economies within this framework. In the era of neoliberalism, 
growth processes have become imbalanced, either relying on growing debt ratios or on 
persistent export surpluses. Two growth processes have emerged: finance-led growth (also 
called debt-led growth), where growth was fuelled by increasing household debt made 
possible by asset and property price bubbles and financial engineering (examples are USA, 
UK, Ireland) and export-led growth, where the main engine of growth have been net exports 
(examples are Germany, Japan, China). Both of these neoliberal growth processes have 
come with wage suppression. Finally, section 6 highlights a wage-led growth strategy as a 
possible alternative. It combines pro-labour distributional policies with structural policies 
that are favourable to wage-led growth. It has the potential for an equitable and 
(economically) sustainable growth process. 
 
 
2. Distribution and growth. A conceptual framework 
 
The relation between distribution and growth had been at the centre of macroeconomic 
analysis in classical economics, but with the dominance of neoclassical economics in the 20th 
century, issues of distribution have occupied a secondary place, since income distribution 
was assumed to be regulated by marginal productivity relations within a perfect 
competition model. In the following we offer a policy-oriented framework to analyse the 
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relation between distribution and growth. We will contrast pro-labour and pro-capital 
distributional policies and wage-led and profit-led demand and supply regimes. Pro-labour 
policies are distributional policies that shift income distribution in favour of labour. Pro-
capital policies do the opposite. Wage-led and profit-led summarize the economic effects of 
changes in income distribution. Economic regimes therefore, here, refer to economic 
outcomes that depend on a rich set of institutional determinants.  
 
Income distribution is the outcome of complex social and economic processes, but 
governments influence it by means of social policy and labour market policy. We define pro-
capital distributional policies as policies that lead to a decline in the wage share and pro-
labour distributional policies as policies that result in an increase in the wage share. Pro-
capital distributional policies are often pursued under the banner of promoting ‘labour 
market flexibility’ or wage flexibility. They include measures that weaken collective 
bargaining institutions (by granting exceptions to bargaining coverage), weakening labour 
unions (e.g. by changing strike laws), lower minimum wages, weaken employment 
protection legislation.1 Pro-labour policies are often referred to as strengthening the welfare 
state and labour market institutions and include strengthening collective bargaining (e.g. by 
extending the reach of bargaining agreements to non-unionised firms), strengthening labour 
unions, increasing unemployment benefits, and reducing wage and salary income 
inequalities. 
 
Of course there are also other factors influencing income distribution, such as technological 
changes, globalisation and financialization. These factors have recently played an important 
role, but we will not elaborate on them here(see section 3), because this section focuses on 
the interaction of distributional policies and economic regime. We will revisit the 
determinants of income distribution in the next section.  
 
Table 1. Pro-labour and pro-capital distributional policies 
 Distributional policies Other factors 
                                                     
1
 Here, and in the following, we assume that (effective) labour demand is inelastic (or upward) sloping (for 
empirical evidence see e.g. Rowthorn 1999). Thus an increase in real wages will correspond to an increase in 
the wage share. 
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 Pro-capital Pro-labour  
Policies  “Labor market flexibility”  
Abolish minimum wages 
Weaken collective 
bargaining 
“Welfare state” 
Increase minimum wages 
Strengthen collective 
bargaining 
Changes in technology 
Globalisation 
Financialization  
Results  Weak wage growth  
Wage share ↓  
Increased wage dispersion 
Rising real wages 
Stable (or ↑) wage share 
Decreased wage dispersion 
 
 
Next we consider the economic structure. An economic regime is a description of actual 
economic structures and institutions, including social security provisions, the financial 
system in place and the degree of openness of the economy. While the economic regime is 
influenced by various forms of government policy, it should be clear that the nature of the 
economic regime is not a choice variable for economic policy in any straightforward sense. It 
should not be understood as the outcome of policy strategy. We will distinguish between 
wage-led and profit-led economic regimes. Furthermore, following conventional practice we 
will distinguish between demand-side (both in the short run and in the long run) and supply-
side (long-run) considerations. The key demand side variable is the level of aggregate 
demand, emphasized by Keynesian economists. The key variable for the supply side is 
productivity growth. 
 
For our purpose, the question is, first, how aggregate demand reacts to a change in income 
distribution. These effects will be quite complex and are discussed in more depth in section 
4. Here we will focus on extreme cases in order to illustrate our framework. Demand may be 
wage led or profit led. A wage-led demand regime means that an increase in the wage share 
leads to an increase in aggregate demand. The wage-led scenario may arise when higher 
wages lead to higher consumption expenditures (higher consumption sales may then also 
induce higher investment expenditures). Conversely, a profit-led demand regime means that 
an increase in the wage share leads to a decline in aggregate demand. Demand may be 
profit-led if investment is highly sensitive to a reduction in profit margins. High profitability 
(at a given rate of capacity utilization) may motivate firms to expand their productive 
capacity and increase investment. 
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Of course there are many factors other than income distribution that determine aggregate 
demand: monetary policy, fiscal policy, various shocks such as oil price shocks, the bursting 
of a stock market bubble, changes in real exchange rates, changes in the growth rate of 
trade partners, etc. Indeed, for most year-to-year changes, income distribution will only be a 
minor influence on the determination of aggregate demand, with other developments 
playing a more prominent role. However, if there are long-lasting, deep changes in income 
distribution as have occurred in the last quarter century, they will end up having a 
substantial role. 
 
Table 2. Economic structure: wage-led and profit-led demand and supply regimes 
  Demand regime  Supply regime  
Economic 
structure 
Profit-led Investment very sensitive to 
profit margins   
A lower wage share leads to 
higher investment  
Wage restraint leads to 
productivity-enhancing investment  
A higher wage share leads to 
lower GDP and slower capital 
accumulation 
Higher Real wage growth leads to 
slower productivity growth 
Wage-led The propensity to consume  out 
of wage income is higher than 
that out of profit income  
Wage growth has strong positive  
effects on labour effort and 
productivity –enhancing 
investments 
A higher wage share leads to 
higher GDP and faster capital 
accumulation 
 
Real wage growth leads to faster 
productivity growth 
Other factors Other sources of demand: 
Government fiscal and monetary policies 
Financial factors: financial asset and real estate price bubbles 
Exchange rate evolution and changes in world demand 
Changes in world commodity prices 
...  
 
Finally, aggregate supply may also be wage led or profit led. The key summary variable for 
the supply side is labour productivity. Productivity will be profit led, if an increase in wages 
discourages productivity-enhancing capital investment and, as a result, the growth of labour 
productivity slows down (most forms of technological progress require capital investment, 
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this is called embodied technological progress). Increases in wage growth may have a 
positive effect on productivity growth, if either firms react by increasing productivity-
enhancing investments in order to maintain competitiveness or if workers’ contribution to 
the production process improves. This may be the case either because of improved workers’ 
motivation or, in developing countries, if their health and nutritional situation improves. 
This case is often called the efficiency wage hypothesis, but we may also call it the Webb 
effect, since a positive causal relationship going from higher real wages to higher 
productivity was already proposed by Sidney Webb (1912), one of the founders of the 
London School of Economics, a long time ago.  
 
A wage-led demand growth regime is a stronger and more long-term concept than wage-led 
demand. While the latter simply implies that an increase in the wage share will lead to an 
increase in aggregate demand or in the rate of capacity utilization, the former additionally 
requires an increase in investment expenditures and productivity growth. Over the long run 
it implies an increase in the rate of accumulation of the capital stock. In contrast, when an 
increase in the wage share implies a decrease in the rate of growth of the capital stock and 
of productivity growth, we then speak of a profit-led demand growth regime.   
 
Table 3 puts the analyses of distributional policies and of economic structures together. For 
simplicity we do not distinguish between demand and productivity regimes, but only discuss 
the economic regime, i.e., we assume that demand and supply react in a similar direction to 
distributional changes. This allows to gain insight in the likely growth dynamics of the 
different regimes and strategies. Between the two sets of distributional policies and the two 
economic structures, four different combinations are possible. These do have quite different 
properties. If pro-capital distributional policies are pursued in a profit-led economy, this will 
result in a profit-led growth process. Inversely, if pro-labour policies are pursued in a wage-
led economy, this will result in a wage-led growth process. These are the two cells in the 
main diagonal in Table 3. In both cases distributional policies and economic structures are 
consistent. However, if pro-capital policies are pursued in a wage-led economy or if a pro-
labour policies are pursued in a profit-led economy, this will result in stagnation, or more 
likely in practise, will result in unstable growth patterns as growth will have to rely on 
external stimulation. 
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Table 3. Viability of growth regimes  
  Distributional policies 
  Pro-capital Pro-labour 
Economic structure  Profit-led Profit-led growth 
process 
Stagnation or unstable 
growth 
Wage-led Stagnation or unstable 
growth 
Wage-led growth 
process 
 
Table 3 is useful in classifying different political ideologies as the four different combinations 
allow to classify many important arguments. Take the first cell (pro-capital policies in a 
profit-led economy). This scenario corresponds to liberal ideology and what is often called 
the trickle down effect: higher profits are said to lead to improved macroeconomic 
performance. Workers will eventually benefit from wage cuts as higher profit margins will 
lead to investment and growth and rewards will eventually trickle down to workers as well, 
in the form of higher employment rates and higher purchasing power. This scenario could 
be called ‘neoliberalism in theory’’.  
 
Table 4. Actual growth strategies in the economic structure/distributional policies 
framework 
  Distributional policies 
  Pro-capital  Pro-labour  
Economic 
structure 
Profit-led ‘Neoliberalism in theory’: 
supply-side policies will 
generate aggregate demand 
(‘trickle down theory’) 
‘Doomed social reforms’  
 TINA 
Wage-led  ‘actually existing 
Neoliberalism’ – unstable 
and has to rely on 
exogenous growth drivers 
(credit-led growth)  
Postwar social Keynesianism 
  
 
The cell pro-labour policies in a wage-led economy summarizes what many economists (e.g. 
Marglin and Schor 1990) regard as a key characteristic of the postwar era: the expansion of 
the welfare state (in advanced economies) led to a golden age of growth.  
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The next cell (pro-labour policies in a profit-led economy) could be called ‘doomed social 
reforms’. It is the scenario that neoliberals claim would happen if progressive social reforms 
were implemented. Margaret Thatcher’s famous dictum ‘there is no alternative’ (TINA) 
makes sense in this cell. Some Marxists use a similar scenario to illustrate the futility of 
attempts to establish a more humane economy within the capitalist mode of production. 
Attempts to raise workers’ consumption or the wage share inevitably lead to a slowdown of 
the economy. 
 
Finally there is the cell pro-capital policies in a wage-led economy. We will argue that this 
describes ‘actually existing neoliberalism’, where two decades of pro-capital distribution 
have resulted in a mediocre economic performance with a heavy reliance on a speculative 
financial sector or on external demand  to achieve growth (see section 5 below).2 
 
The following sections will summarize some of the available evidence to evaluate which 
scenario describes actual economies.  
 
 
3. Decline in the wage share. What are the causes? 
 
In the last quarter century dramatic changes in income distribution have taken place. This 
refers to the personal distribution of income as well as to the functional distribution of 
income.3 Wage shares have fallen in virtually all OECD countries, with decreases typically 
being more pronounced in continental European countries (and Japan) than in the Anglo-
Saxon countries. In the Euro area the (adjusted) wage share has fallen from 72.5 in 1982 to 
63.3% in 2007 (Fig. 1). Personal income distribution has become more unequal in almost all 
OECD countries (OECD 2008), with the very top income groups increasing their income 
                                                     
2 Although some researchers would argue instead that reliance on free market mechanisms and more flexible 
labour markets have generated large increases in world real income over the last three decades (Balcerowiz 
and Fisher, 2006). But these authors forget to compare the last decades to the evolution of the 1950s and 
1960s. For rich discussions of neoliberalism see Harvey (2003) and Glyn (2006). 
3
 Personal income distribution refers to the distribution of income across households (or individuals) 
irrespective of the type of income involved. Functional income distribution refers to the distribution of income 
between wages and capital incomes (usually referred to as ‘profits’).  
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shares substantially in the Anglo Saxon countries, in particular in the USA (Piketty and Saez 
2003; Atkinson et al. 2011). In a multi-country study Daudey and Garcia-Penalosa (2007) 
show that there is a positive correlation between changes in personal and functional income 
distribution. Overall, median real wage growth has clearly lagged behind productivity 
growth since around 1980. This constitutes a major historical change as wage shares had 
been stable or increasing in the postwar era.  
 
Figure 1. Adjusted wage shares in the Euro area, the USA and Japan, 1960-2009 
 
Source: AMECO 
 
This has recently led to a renewed interest in the determinants of the distribution of 
income, with major economic research institutions like the OECD and the IMF publishing 
prominent studies. OECD (2008) documents changes in personal income distribution. IMF 
(2007a) and European Commission (EC 2007) investigate changes in functional income 
distribution and OECD (2007) analyses the wage elasticity of the labour demand function. 
IMF (2007a) and EC (2007) make a strong case that technological change has been the main 
cause of changes in functional income distribution, that globalization (of trade and 
production) has also played an important role and, finally, that changes in labor market 
institutions have played a minor role. Technological change is empirically measured as ICT 
(Information and Communication Technology) investment or ICT services. The general 
thrust of the argument is in line with the neoclassical theory of income distribution, which 
regards distribution as essentially technologically determined. 
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Globalization also features prominently in the debate. The standard trade-theory argument 
is built on the Stolper and Samuelson (1941) Theorem, which states that the abundant 
factor will gain from trade liberalisation. For Northern countries, supposedly, this is capital 
whereas labor is abundant in developing countries such as China and India that have 
recently entered the global economy. Globalization is thus supposed to benefit capital in the 
north and labor in the south. 4 
 
While the Stolper-Samuleson argument describes a competitive long-run equilibrium, the 
Political Economy of trade approach highlights distributional effects of globalization in a 
bargaining setting. For example, Rodrik (1997) argues that trade liberalization (even among 
similar countries will affect distribution and will benefit the more mobile factor, which will 
typically be capital. Unlike the Stolper-Samuelson approach, Rodrik’s argument is set in a 
bargaining framework. The change in distribution takes place because of a redistribution of 
rents, not because of the equalization of factor costs. Moreover, in the Stolper-Samuelson 
theorem one would expect distribution to change after production has been relocated. In 
contrast, Epstein and Burke (2001) argue that due to threat effects redistribution can take 
place without changes in production locations.   
 
While there are differences in the theoretical arguments the empirical assessment is rather 
clear. All studies find substantial effects of globalization on functional income distribution. 
For example IMF (2007a) concludes “globalization is one of several factors that have acted 
to reduce the share of income accruing to labor in advanced economies” (IMF 2007a, 161). 
 
                                                     
4
 The Stolper-Samuelson theorem assumes that firms have not market power and that neither capital nor labor 
are mobile; its effects take place through trade in competitive equilibrium. However, the recent period of 
globalization has been marked by an increase in capital mobility. “If capital can travel across borders, the 
implications of the theorem weaken substantially” (EC 2007, 45). Moreover, classical international trade 
theory is unable to explain the actual pattern of trade, which takes place mostly among developed countries. 
According to standard trade theory it is not obvious why North-North trade should affect income distribution 
(assuming that relative factor prices are similar). Second, labor is not a homogenous input. While unskilled 
labor (in the North) may lose from globalization, skilled labor may indeed gain. If so, it is a priori not clear how 
the total wage share in the North should be affected. 
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A third set of factors that influence income distribution is financial deregulation (or more 
broadly speaking, financialization).5 Financial deregulation has had two important effects on 
the bargaining position of labor. First, firms have gained more options for investing: they 
can invest in financial assets as well as in real assets and they can invest at home as well as 
abroad. They have gained mobility in terms of the geographical location as well as in term of 
the content of investment. Second, it has empowered shareholders relative to workers. The 
development of a market for corporate control has aligned management’s interest to that 
of shareholders (Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000, Stockhammer 2004). Rossmann (2009) 
illustrates this with reference to private equity funds, which buy firms by way of debt that is 
transferred to the firm. The surplus is siphoned to the private equity fund through dividend 
payments or fees. The restructured firms then are heavily burdened with servicing their 
debt and have little alternative to pursuing an aggressive cost-cutting strategy. For 
countries, where data is available, the increase in dividend payout is well documented 
(Duménil and Lévy 2001). Power et al (2003) document the increasing income share of 
rentiers.  
 
So far few econometric studies on changes in functional income distribution have included 
financialization variables. ILO (2008) argues that “financial globalization has led to a 
depression of the share of wages in GDP” (ILO 2008, 39), but does not provide evidence. 
Jayadev (2007) analyses the effect of financial openness and trade openness on the wage 
share in an econometric analysis covering up to 80 countries for the period 1970-2001. The 
openness variables are legal measures on openness. Capital account openness and trade 
openness are found to have negative effects on the wage share. Remarkably, IMF (2007b) in 
a study on personal income distribution within countries has included foreign direct 
investment (FDI) stocks.  
 
In a detailed study attempting to replicate and extend IMF (2007a) and EC (2007) 
Stockhammer (2009) finds that the results for technological change are not robust, whereas 
the effects of globalisation are confirmed. He then extends the estimation specifications to 
                                                     
5
 Financialization refers to the increased influence of financial institutions and financial motives on non-
financial activities. 
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include a measure for financial globalisation and allows for different effects of trade union 
density in countries where trade union membership is a precondition for receiving 
unemployment benefits. He finds that financial globalisation has strong effects and the 
organisational strength of labour unions has a robust effect.  
 
 
4. Economic effects of a declining wage share 
 
While the previous section has discussed the causes of the decline in the wage share, this 
section turns to its effects. It is standard in economic theory to distinguish between the 
demand-side and supply-side effects., where demand effects refer to changes in 
expenditures for a given productive capacity and technology, while supply-side effects 
involve changes in machinery and technology. The key summary variable for the supply side 
is (the growth of) labour productivity. We will follow the same distinction here, being 
understood, as was pointed out in the second section, that demand effects can spill over to 
the growth rate of capital accumulation. 6 
 
4.1 Demand effects 
 
What are the effects of change in the wage share on aggregate demand? Aggregate demand 
consists of private consumption expenditures , investment expenditures, net exports  and 
government expenditures. In the following we focus on the reaction of the private sector 
and treat government expenditures as an exogenous policy variable.  
 
A change in income distribution will have several effects on the components of demand that 
pull in different directions. First, consumption expenditures are likely to be a positive 
function of the wage share. Higher wages will typically lead to higher consumption 
expenditures because wage earners normally have a higher propensity to consume than 
                                                     
6
 Mainstream economics regards demand effects as purely short-run effects as it regards the economy to be 
strongly anchored in a supply-determined equilibrium to which the economy will return. Keynes, who 
pioneered the analysis of demand formation, was rather sceptical of long-run analysis. Post-Keynesian 
economics, built on the works of  Keynes, Kalecki and Steindl, highlight that aggregate demand plays a crucial 
role even in the long run.  
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recipients of capital income. This is because workers are typically poorer than capitalists (or 
other recipients of capital income). Furthermore, a large proportion of gross profits are 
saved by firms in the form of retained earnings. The size of this income distribution effect 
will depend on the difference in income between capital and labour, on the social security 
system, which influences savings rates, but also on other features such as house prices and 
capital gains on the stock market.  Second, investment expenditures are likely to react 
negatively to an increase in the wage share, i.e., to a decrease in the profit share (for a given 
level of national income). From an intuitive point of view, a reduction in the profit share for 
a given level of national income implies that the profit margins of firms have gone down.  
Since expected future profits ought to be an important stimulant for investment, a 
reduction in profit margins, i.e., a reduction in the profit rate assessed at normal rates of 
utilization of capacity ought to have a negative effect on investment.  The precise effect will 
depend on the structure and liquidity of the financial system and on what Keynes called the 
psychology of the investor, e.g. after a financial crisis firms may be reluctant to 
investbecause of increased uncertainty. Thirdly, net exports are likely to react negatively to 
increases in the wage share because, for a given exchange rate, the increase in the wage 
share will decrease profits margin and/or make exports less competitive abroad. The size of 
this effect will depend on the degree of openness of the economy and the types of products 
that the economy is importing and exporting. 
 
The effects on the three aggregates thus pull in different directions. An increase in the wage 
share is likely to increase consumption, but decrease investment and net exports. The net 
effect is not clear a priori, but will depend on the relative size of these effects. If the 
consumption effect is stronger than the investment and net export effects then the overall 
effect is positive and the economy is in a wage-led demand regime. Conversely, if 
investment and net exports react more strongly, the overall effect of an increase in the 
wage share on demand is negative and the demand regime is called profit led. This 
distinction is based on the theoretical work of Bhaduri and Marglin (1990) and Blecker 
(1989).  
 
Note that the model outlined above includes net exports. One country’s exports are some 
other country’s imports. This raises the possibility of a fallacy of composition: while each 
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individual country can increase its demand by exporting more, not all countries can do so at 
the same time. The world economy overall is a closed economy. It is thus interesting to look 
at the domestic effect and the total effects (i.e., including net exports) separately. The 
domestic effects only include the effects on consumption and investment and should be 
interpreted as a scenario when the change in the wage share affects all trading partners 
simultaneously. It can be thought of a change in the world wage share. 
 
Regarding the consumption behaviour, the saving differential between rich and poor is well 
established empirically. As an illustration Table 5 reports the saving rates for different 
income groups for Germany. In 1995 the bottom quarter of the income distribution had 
saving rate of 7.3%, whereas the richest quarter had as saving rate of 13.8%. Saving rates 
clearly increase with income level. Germany experienced a dramatic increase in inequality in 
the last decades. This also affects different saving propensities. In 2007 the lowest quartile 
had a saving rate of 4.1% whereas the richest quartile had a saving propensity of 15.8%. 
 
Table 5. Saving rates by income group for Germany 
 1995 2001 2007 
bottom quartile 7.3 5.4 4.1 
3rd quartile  9.5 9.3 8.0 
2nd quartile  11.3 10.1 9.0 
top quartile  13.8 13.1 15.8 
Source: Stein (2011) based on SOEP (Socio-Economic Panel) data 
 
These models have recently inspired a rich empirical literature trying to identify demand 
regimes by econometric means. Table 6 gives an overview of the empirical results. These 
studies differ by the countries and time period covered as well as by the method employed 
(see Hein and Vogel 2008 Table 1 and Stockhammer and Stehrer 2011 for more extensive 
discussions) and are thus difficult to compare. Overall the majority of studies find that 
domestic demand regimes tend to be wage-led, whereas international trade turns many 
economies into a profit-led regime.  
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Table 6. Econometric studies on wage-led and profit-led demand regimes 
 Domestic Demand  Total Demand  
 wage-led  Profit-led  wage-led  Profit-led  
Euro area  SOE09   SOE09   
Germany  BB95, NS07, HV08, 
SHG11, SS11  
 NS07, HV08, SHG11  BB95  
France  BB95, NS07, SE07, HV08, 
SS11  
 (SO04), NS07, HV08  BB95, SE07  
NL  NS07, SS11  HV08  NS07  HV08  
Austria  SE08, HV08, SS11      SE08, HV08  
UK  BB95, NS07, HV08  SS11  BB95, NS07, HV08   
Japan  BB95  NS07   BB95, NS07  
USA  BB95, HV08, OSG12, 
(SS11)  
NS07  BB95, HV08, OSG12  (SO04), NS07, 
BFT06  
Note. Reference in brackets denote statistically insignificant results. 
BB95: Bowles and Boyer 1995; BFT08: Barboso-Filho and Taylor 2006; ES07: Ederer and Stockhammer 2007; 
HV08: Hein and Vogel 2008; NS07 Naastepad and Storm 2006-07; OSG12: Onaran et al. 2012; SO04: 
Stockhammer and Onaran 2004; SE08: Stockhammer and Ederer 2008; SHG11: Stockhammer et al 2011; 
SOE09: Stockhammer et al 2009; SS11: Stockhammer and Stehrer 2011 
 
To illustrate the orders of magnitude involved Table 7 summarizes the results for a large, 
relatively closed economy, the Euro area and for a small open economy, Austria (based on 
Stockhammer et al 2009 and Stockhammer and Ederer 2008 respectively). A 1%-point 
increase in the wage share would lead to an increase in consumption by 0.37 (%-points of 
GDP) in the Euro area and 0.36 in Austria. Investment would decline by 0.07 and 0.15 
respectively. Domestic demand is wage led in both cases (by .3 in the EU12 and .21 in 
Austria). The net export effect is -0.09 in the EU12, but -0.39 in Austria. The total demand 
regime is thus wage led in the EU (a 1%-pt increase in the wages share leads to a .21%-pt 
increase in demand), but profit led in Austria (-0.18).7 
 
                                                     
7
 While I consider these values plausible, other researchers disagree. Naastepad and Storm (2006/07) tend to 
find much higher investment effects and much lower net export effects. These results are based on single-
equation estimators. Systems estimators tend to find stronger profit effects (Barbosa -Filho and Taylor 2006, 
Flaschel and Proano 2007). My experience is that the consumption effect is rather reliable, though often rather 
small in Anglo-Saxon countries. Investment effects are usually very sensitive to the exact specification of the 
estimation equation. This is probably because profits and demand are highly correlated and investment is a 
highly pro-cyclical variable itself. The net export effect depends on assumptions about the exchange rate. 
Several early studies did not allow for globalisation to affect the wage-sensitivity of exports. Two concluding 
comments on the literature need to be made: first, the simultaneity issue between distribution and demand 
lurks unresolved in the background. Second, the set of control variables controlling for other factors is rather 
limited in most estimations. 
17 
 
Table 7 
 Effects on private excess demand (in % of GDP) 
   EU 12 
(openness <15%) 
Austria 
(openness > 50%) 
Consumption  0.37 0.36 
Investment  -0.07 -0.15 
Domestic sector  0.30 0.21 
Net exports  -0.09 -0.39 
Total effect  0.21 -0.18 
Source: EU12 Stockhammer et al 2009; Austria: Stockhammer and Ederer 2008 
 
These results have important policy implications for regional economic integration. Take the 
Euro area as an example. As elsewhere, wage shares have fallen drastically in the Euro area. 
This has been encouraged by the European Commission, which has advocated a strategy of 
improving competitiveness for a long time (European Commission 1995, 1996, 1997). 
Indeed many European countries have implemented ‘wage pacts’ that combine wage 
restraint with other policy measures (Schulten 2002). The results in Table 7 illustrate an 
important economic difference between the Euro area and its member states. While many 
member states are small open economies, in which a wage restraint may boost demand via 
exports, the Euro area as a whole is a large, relatively closed economy. Most trade of Euro 
member states takes place within the Euro area. A wage cut in the Euro area will increase 
net exports, but domestic demand will shrink by more. Wage policy is thus in a prisoners’ 
dilemma-type situation. For individual member states wage restraint may be an attractive 
strategy, but if everyone pursues it, it will have negative effects. European wage 
coordination would, at least in principle make it easier to overcome the prisoners’ dilemma 
and internalize the externalities of wage agreements (Stockhammer 2008, Hein and Truger 
2004). However, the differences in wage bargaining systems make this difficult in practise.  
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4.2 Supply side effects 
 
On the supply side, the key question is how changes in the wage share or in real wages 
affect productivity growth (or more broadly speaking, technological progress). Mainstream 
economists typically argue that competitive markets are most conducive to growth and, in 
the next step, argue for labour market (and product market) deregulation. Critical 
economists highlight that labour market institutions can not only have positive social effects 
as they help overcome market failures, but they also may have positive effects on economic 
growth because good labour relations will improve the propensity of workers to contribute 
to the production process.  
 
Recently, this has inspired several empirical studies. Storm and Naastepad (2009) 
investigate labour market institutions in twenty OECD countries. They find that relatively 
regulated and coordinated (‘rigid’) institutions lead to higher productivity growth. Hein and 
Tarassow (2010) analyse the link between income distribution and productivity growth for 
six OECD economies by means of time series analysis and report that higher profit shares 
have a negative effect on productivity growth. Vergeer and Kleinknecht (2011) perform a 
panel analysis for OECD countries from 1960 to 2004 and find that higher wage growth leads 
to higher productivity growth. They interpret this as implying that stronger labour market 
institutions lead to faster long-run growth. These studies face challenges in identifying the 
direction of causality and the distinction between short-run and long-run effects; and more 
research is certainly needed. However, it seems fair to conclude that the available evidence 
does not suggest that real wage growth has any negative long-run effect on labour 
productivity growth. 
 
Wages have a dual function in capitalist economies. They are a cost of production as well as 
a source of demand. An increase in the wage share has several effects on demand and 
whether actual demand regimes are wage led or profit led is subject to an ongoing academic 
debate. Our interpretation of the available evidence is that domestic demand regimes are 
likely to be wage led in most economies. In open economies the net export effects may 
overpower the domestic effects and total demand in many individual countries may well be 
profit led. However, countries trade among each other. Larger geographical (or economic) 
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areas are therefore likely to be wage led. The world economy overall is probably in a wage-
led demand regime. There is comparatively less research on the supply-side effects of an 
increase in the wage share. However, there are several studies that find positive effects of 
wage increases on productivity growth, suggesting that the long-term effects of wage 
expansion are unlikely to be harmful. 
 
 
5. Classifying recent growth regimes and strategies: credit-led growth, export-led 
growth or wage-led growth 
 
Neoliberalism came with the promise that deregulation of goods markets, labour markets 
and financial markets would lead to higher growth and increased welfare. Higher inequality 
was to be accepted because it yields economic benefits. In our terminology, neoliberalism 
posited a strongly profit-led economic regime. But Neoliberalism has failed to deliver on its 
promise. Growth rates in the allegedly overregulated postwar era were higher than in the 
neoliberal phase. Deregulation did indeed generate increased inequality, but without much 
of the benefits that were supposed to come with it.  
 
But if the world economy is indeed wage led, how did neoliberal economies grow at all? 
Neoliberalism, in practice, has operated in the south-east cell of Tables 3 and 4, pursuing a 
strategy based on pro-capital distributional policies, but within an essentially wage-led 
economic structure. Such a strategy will lead either to stagnation – or it has to rely on 
external factors for stimulating growth. Indeed the latter is what has characterized the 
performance of what we might call ‘actually existing neoliberalism’. Instead of generating a 
robust growth path based on the profit-investment link, growth has relied on either 
financial bubbles and rising indebtedness (in short, finance-led growth) or it has relied on a 
mercantilist strategy based on export surpluses (Stockhammer 2011, Horn and van Treeck 
2011). Boom-bust cycles driven by stock markets, property markets or capital flows have 
been a key feature of actually existing neoliberalism: the Latin American crises of the 1980s 
and of the mid 1990s (the Peso crisis), the EMS (European Monetary System) crisis 
(1992/93), the South East Asia crisis (1997/98), the dot.com bubble burst 2000/01 and the 
Great Recession of 2008/09. 
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To understand this pattern one has to appreciate the central role of financial deregulation 
for the neoliberal growth model. Financial deregulation has allowed financial innovation and 
has given rise to speculative boom bust cycles and, over long periods, to increasing debt 
levels for financial institutions and households. Booms on stock markets and property 
markets often attract capital inflows that fuel the bubbles further (Reinhart and Reinhart 
2008). But the liberalization of capital flows also means that some countries will have to 
have current account surpluses and net capital outflows. International financial deregulation 
thereby has given rise to two symbiotic growth models: a credit-led growth model (with 
capital inflows) and an export-led model (with capital outflows). While growth has been 
driven by consumption growth fuelled by rising household debt in the Anglo-Saxon 
countries, and especially in the leading country, the USA, other countries have subdued 
domestic demand, including that arising from the government sector, and have heavily 
relied on net exports as the key growth engine.  
 
While admittedly not all countries fit this dichotomy of credit-led and export-led growth 
models neatly, it is useful as it captures an important part of the dynamics behind the 
growing international imbalances and it highlights that both models compensate for a lack 
of domestic demand. Both growth models have occurred in centre as well as in the 
periphery. In particular in Europe the central countries (Germany and its smaller cousins) 
have features of export-led growth, whereas the peripheral countries within the Euro zone 
have had credit-led growth. Table 8 gives a stylized classification of important countries. 
 
Table 8. Growth models of actually existing Neoliberalism 
 Credit-led Export-led 
Centre US, UK Germany, Austria, Japan 
Periphery Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain China 
 
Two statistics will help substantiate the usefulness of the distinction in credit-led and 
export-led economies. First, Table 9 gives the increase in household debt (as % of GDP) in 
major European economies and the USA (comparable data for Japan and China were not 
readily available). While household debt declined in Germany by 11.34%-points of GDP from 
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2000 to 2008, it grew by a modest 7.9%-points in Austria, but it grew by well above 25%-
points in the credit-led group. In the USA and the UK it grew by 26%-points and 28.13%-
points respectively. In Greece, Portugal and Spain, household debt increased by 35.46, 37.38 
and 33.84%-points. In Ireland it even grew by a staggering 62.72%-points.  
 
Table 9. Increase in household debt, 2000-2008 
Germany  -11.34 USA 26 
Netherlands 32.83 UK 28.13 
Austria 7.91 Ireland 62.72 
  Greece 35.46 
  Spain 33.84 
  Italy 18.32 
  Portugal 27.38 
Source: Eurostat: Financial Flows and Stocks by Sector; USA: Flows of Funds; Ireland starts 2001 instead of 
2000 
 
It turns out that those countries with rising household debt, with few exceptions, have also 
been the countries that ran current account deficits, whereas those with little changes in 
household indebtedness have been the countries with current account surpluses.8  
 
Table 10. International imbalances: current account as % of GDP, 2007 
Germany  7.9  United Kingdom  -2.7  
Austria  3.6  United States  -5.2  
Netherlands  8.7        
      Greece  -14.5  
Japan  4.8  Ireland  -5.3  
China  5.2  Spain  -10.0  
      Portugal  -9.4  
  Italy  -2.4  
Source: OECD 
 
In 2007, i.e., before the financial crisis, Germany and Austria had current account surpluses 
of 7.9% and 3.6% (of GDP) respectively, while Japan and China had current account 
surpluses of 4.8% and 5.2%. On the other hand the USA and the UK had deficits of 5.2% and 
                                                     
8
 In a sense, this is not unexpected, since by identity, as pointed out in particular by the late Wynne Godley, 
domestic household net borrowing + corporate net borrowing + public borrowing = current account deficit.  
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2.7%, and Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain had deficits of 14.5%, 5.3%, 9.4% and 10% 
respectively.9 
 
Actually existing neoliberalism has not led to a growth process via investment. Rather it has 
relied on other factors for growth. Rising household debt has temporarily made up for wage 
growth (Barba and Pivetti 2009) in the credit-led growth model; increasing trade surpluses 
have been the growth engine of a second group of countries, that have followed an export-
led growth model. Both of these growth models are not sustainable. Financial bubbles 
eventually burst and debts have to be serviced and possibly repaid (for otherwise, 
bankruptcy occurs), while export-led growth relies on other countries to import and leads to 
the impoverishment of the importing countries and to growing international imbalances. 
 
 
6. Wage-led growth – a viable economic strategy 
 
But there is an alternative to neoliberalism. If, as we have argued, the world economy (and, 
indeed, large countries and or economic blocks) are indeed wage led, then a wage-led 
growth strategy is a viable option. A wage-led growth strategy would have to combine pro-
labour distributional social and labour market policies with a regulation of the financial 
sector.  
 
Distributional policies that increase the wage share and reduce wage dispersion include 
increasing or establishing minimum wages, strengthening social security systems, improving 
union legislation and increasing the reach of collective bargaining agreements. All of these 
are against orthodox economic wisdom and, under the perceived pressure to reduce budget 
deficits, economic policy is recently moving in the opposite direction. However, in times of 
crisis and a lack of effective demand, what economies need is more state involvement, not 
less. A successful policy package to economic recovery will also have sustained wage growth 
                                                     
9
 With the exception of Ireland current account positions and net export positions are similar. Ireland, in past 
decades, has had current account deficits, but net export surpluses. This is because of the large amount of 
repatriated profits, thus leading to a large discrepancy between GDP and GNP. 
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as one of its core building blocks. Only when wages grow with productivity growth will 
consumption expenditures grow without rising debt levels. 
 
To be successful a modern version of a wage-led growth strategy will require a restructuring 
of the financial sector. The deregulated financial sector has fuelled speculative growth and 
resulted in the worst recession since the 1930s. If a repeat of the crisis is to be prevented, 
this will require  managing  international capital flows, a re-focussing of the financial sector 
on narrow banking, the elimination of destabilizing financial innovations, and a higher fiscal 
contribution of the financial sector (e.g., in the form of a financial transactions tax). 
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